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INTRODUCTION
The decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Tswelopele Non-Profit
Organisation & 23 others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality & others
[2007] SCA70 (RSA) (hereafter Tswelopele) is the outcome of a rather cynical
illegal eviction of about one hundred persons from a piece of land in the
Pretoria suburb of Garsfontein. During the eviction the building materials of
the shacks inhabited by the occupiers were destroyed, together with some
personal belongings. The eviction was carried out by ofﬁcials of the Tshwane
Metropolitan Municipality, the immigration control ofﬁce of the Depart-
ment of HomeAffairs, the SouthAfrican Police Services and the Garsfontein
Community Policing Forum. The eviction took place without a court order
and in direct violation of s 26(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa, 1996 and the applicable sections of the Prevention of Illegal
Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE) (see
Tswelopele para 2). Despite earlier protestations and evasions, the relevant
authorities subsequently admitted that their actions were unlawful and
offered an unambiguous apology (para 8). The unlawfulness of the eviction
was therefore eventually not in question.
The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) made it clear from the outset that it
was determined somehow to rectify the situation. The court pointed out that
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the illegal eviction did not merely violate the constitutional and statutory
warrant against unauthorized eviction, but also the occupiers’ right to
personal security, privacy, and property in their materials and belongings, and
that it trampled upon their dignity, their feelings and their social standing
(para 15). In expressing its disapproval of the authorities’ illegal actions, the
court compared the cynicism with which the authorities exploited the social
and economic weakness of the occupiers with the ‘exposure of the most
vulnerable in society to police power and their vulnerability to its abuse’
under apartheid (para 16). In view of all this, the court stated emphatically,
‘cases such as this demand an effective remedy’ to ensure that the changes
heralded by the Constitution amount to more than mere rhetoric (para 17).
The court was adamant that an effective remedy had to be identiﬁed or
created for those applicants who had lost their de facto occupation of the
demolished shacks and were not subsequently accommodated satisfactorily
elsewhere. It was therefore clear from the start that the appeal was going to
succeed — merely dismissing the application, as was done in the court a quo,
was not enough to satisfy the court’s sense of justice.
The main issue for decision was the correct remedy. Although they also
invoked the procedural protections of PIE and ss 25 and 26(3) of the
Constitution, the applicants initially couched their application in the form of
an application for the mandament van spolie, asking for an order directing
the relevant authorities to restore possession of the demolished shacks to the
occupiers ante omnia (see para 4). The court a quo dismissed the application,
following the decision in Rikhotso v Northcliff Ceramics (Pty) Ltd 1997 (1) SA
526 (W) in holding that restoration of possession was impossible because the
relevant building materials had been destroyed (see para 6; on the decision in
Rikhotso see A J van der Walt ‘Squatting, spoliation orders and the new
constitutional order’ (1997) 60 THRHR 522). On appeal the SCA
overturned the decision a quo and restored the applicants who had not been
accommodated elsewhere to a position similar to what they had enjoyed
before the eviction, despite the fact that a restoration order required the use
of replacement materials.
HISTORICAL, SOCIAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
The SCA was laudably clear and decisive in its refusal to countenance the
illegal eviction and its determination to rectify the situation. Not giving a
restoration order of some kind in this case would have undermined the
efﬁcacy and legal force of the anti-eviction provisions in s 26(3) of the
Constitution and in the land-reform legislation. On this point the decision
must be welcomed. The only issues for discussion in this note are the court’s
views on the correct remedy and the implications this decision has for the
continuing debate about the Constitution-driven development of the
common law.
The fact that the SCAdecided to uphold the appeal and ﬁnd a way to assist
the applicants is hardly surprising. The Constitutional Court made it
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abundantly clear in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA
217 (CC) paras 19–23 (hereafter P E Municipality) that conﬂicts between land
ownership and unlawful squatting can no longer be terminated simply by
mechanically allowing landowners to evict unlawful occupiers — in the
residential context, ownership can no longer trump weaker occupation or
housing interests in the same way it did before 1994. In the wake of
apartheid, eviction has become a constitutional issue, and therefore conﬂicts
between ownership of land and housing interests have to be resolved by
establishing ‘an appropriate constitutional relationship’ (P E Municipality para
19) between the property rights in s 25 and the housing rights in s 26 or,
stated differently, between respect for property rights and empathy for
homelessness and land hunger. The constitutional injunction to balance the
housing rights of even unlawful occupiers against the property rights of
landowners applies even more strongly when the eviction was carried out
from a position of state power and with cynical disregard for the
constitutional and statutory requirements.
The decision in P E Municipality also established that the historical, social
and constitutional context within which conﬂicts between landowners and
unlawful occupiers appear is an important factor that needs to be considered
when deciding eviction cases. It was said in that decision that the
Constitution places new obligations on the courts to avoid a hierarchical
view of property and housing rights and to balance and reconcile them in as
just a manner as possible, taking into account all the interests involved and
the circumstances of each case (para 23). Although P E Municipality made it
clear that the new constitutional and statutory framework does not exclude
the possibility of evicting even otherwise homeless and destitute persons, an
important message from that decision is that the historical, social and political
baggage of eviction must be considered very carefully when deciding
eviction cases in future.
Given this historical and constitutional context and the fact that illegal
evictions in this case also violated the occupiers’ right to personal security,
privacy and property in their materials and belongings and trampled upon
their dignity, their feelings and their social standing, the court was clearly
justiﬁed in coming to the assistance of the applicants. The SCA noted this
would instil the required humility in the authorities who wield power over
the weak and marginalized and could bring reassurance and hope for those
who had been affected by the high-handedness of the authorities in the past
(para 27). This is an apt description of the very essence and purpose of the
new constitutional order and of the anti-eviction measures introduced as a
direct response to the abuses of apartheid land law.
As a ﬁrst step, the court considered several existing remedies such as an
action for damages, criminal prosecution, an interdict, and accommodation
of the evictees in ‘the Grootboom emergency relief and housing queue’ (para
18(d)) and found them all wanting; none would provide the speciﬁc group of
applicants with effective relief that would be speedy and also effectively
‘address the consequences of the breach of their rights’ (para 19). The only
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way to do that, the court stated, would be ‘to vindicate the occupiers’ salvage
claim, and to require the respondents to recreate their shelters’, even if only
on a temporary basis (ibid). In other words, the best order would be to
instruct the authorities to undo the damage done by their illegal action and to
restore the applicants in temporary occupation of shelters similar to those
that had been demolished. The court accordingly ordered the respondents to
construct ‘temporary habitable dwellings that afford shelter, privacy and
amenities at least equivalent to those that were destroyed, and which are
capable of being dismantled, at the site at which their previous shelters were
demolished’, for those applicants who were unlawfully evicted and who still
required replacement shelters (para 29).
The ﬁnal question was how that result could best be explained in terms of
existing law. More speciﬁcally, the question was whether the mandament
van spolie was the best remedy by which to reach the desired outcome,
namely a temporary restoration order. In one sense identiﬁcation of the
speciﬁc remedy is not so important because a constitutional remedy could be
crafted to do the necessary, but in another sense it is important to consider
the possibilities of using and developing a common-law remedy, as I will
argue in the remainder of this note.
FINDING THE BEST REMEDY
The applicability of the mandament van spolie in this case raised three
separate but related issues. The ﬁrst question is whether the remedy is
(historically and doctrinally) suitable in cases where restoration would
necessarily imply use of replacement materials. If the answer to the ﬁrst
question is negative, the second question is whether the common-law
remedy should be developed in terms of the Constitution to make such an
order possible. If the answer is again negative, the third question is whether a
constitutional remedy could be crafted to make the order possible. In the
event, the court answered both the ﬁrst and second question negatively and
opted for the third possibility.
On the ﬁrst point I argue, with reference to the doctrinal debate of the
1980s, that it is not entirely clear that the mandament van spolie should
necessarily be unavailable simply because the original materials had been
destroyed. My second point is that, even if it is accepted that the
impossibility argument is conclusive and that the mandament was historically
not available where replacement materials had to be used, there are sound
reasons why the remedy should now be developed in terms of the
Constitution to make it available in certain instances where restoration
would imply the use of replacement materials. Thirdly, I argue that the
creation of a completely new constitutional remedy in this case — the
solution opted for by the SCA— was unnecessary and unfortunate.
Can the mandament be used?
It was pointed out in the court a quo and the earlier Rikhotso decision (supra)
that the remedy relied on by the appellants, the mandament van spolie, was a
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possessory remedy that could only be used to restore lost possession of
spoliated things, because such an order would extend the remedy beyond its
traditional limits of restoring possession. The court a quo accepted and
followed this argument and therefore dismissed the application.
After considering the background of the mandament van spolie and case
law on instances where the despoiled property was destroyed, the SCA
decided that the doctrinal analysis in Rikhotso was ‘undoubtedly correct’ in
that the object of the remedy was to restore ‘physical control and enjoyment
of speciﬁed property — not its reconstituted equivalent’ (para 24). The
mandament van spolie could therefore not be used to force a spoliator to
restore the despoiled property if doing so would require using alternative
materials. In coming to this conclusion the court referred to some of the case
law and part of the academic debate of the 1980s on this issue, but its analysis
is disappointingly brief for such an important and seemingly conclusive
ﬁnding.
The core of the impossibility argument that was upheld in Rikhotso — and
by extension in this case — concerns the nature of the remedy. (These
arguments have been rehearsed more fully in Van der Walt op cit at 525.) In
the 1980s Duard Kleyn ‘Die mandament van spolie as besitsremedie’ 1986
De Jure 1 quite correctly argued that the mandament van spolie is a possessory
remedy, aimed at restoration of possession, and that possession could
technically not be restored once the property had been destroyed. Hence, he
argued, the remedy was not suited for occasions where replacement materials
had to be used to effect restoration. As was pointed out in Rikhotso, this
argument is not undermined by the commonly accepted view that the
spoliation remedy can include an order to take steps to place the property in
its former condition or to effect minor repairs or reinstallation, as appears
from decisions such as Zinman v Miller 1956 (3) SA 8 (T) and Vena v George
Municipality 1987 (4) SA 29 (C); 1989 (2) SA 263 (A). However, to employ
the mandament van spolie in cases that require wholesale use of replacement
materials to reconstruct the destroyed property would, so the argument
went, run the risk of transforming the remedy into a ‘general remedy against
unlawfulness’ (Rikhotso at 533I–J). The same points are still raised against use
of the mandament when the property in question has been destroyed, but
the common-law impossibility argument is not as strong as it seems.
Given the quite speciﬁc requirements that tie the remedy to situations
where self-help involves spoliation of previously existing possession of
tangible property, it is quite clear that the mandament is not (nor should it
become) a general remedy to trump unlawful action (Van der Walt op cit at
525). To the extent that there was a debate about this point in the 1980s, it
largely rested upon semantics and misunderstandings. Of course the
‘peace-keeping’ aspect of the remedy is important — it is what sets the
mandament apart from other property remedies, because the mandament has
only the one function, namely temporarily to restore possession for the sake
of public peace or to discourage self-help. Other remedies also serve a
peace-keeping function in the sense that they promote judicial rather than
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self-help solutions to legal conﬂicts, but they do so in conjunction with their
main purpose of simultaneously protecting or vindicating a particular right; a
consideration that does not feature at all in the mandament van spolie.
However, having said that, it clearly does not follow (and was never
suggested) that the remedy should be expanded to become a general
peace-keeping remedy — its requirements should always ensure that its
peace-keeping function remains ﬁxed in the sphere of dispossession. In the
debate that the court refers to, the point was therefore not whether the
mandament should become a general peace-keeping remedy but whether its
particular peace-keeping function should inspire the courts to use the
remedy to discourage spoliators who cynically destroy the dispossessed
property in order to avoid a restoration order being given against them.
Obviously this possibility would always require a policy call and in many
instances it might not be feasible — when non-fungible property is destroyed
the mandament clearly cannot be used because restoration has then really
become impossible.
A suggestion made in the 1980s debate was that there might be some cases,
especially those involving eviction from and cynical destruction of informal
shacks in which people lived, where such a replacement order could be both
workable and suitable, given the social and political context. The very fact
that the SCA in Tswelopele decided that restoration was not only justiﬁed, but
that replacement materials had to be used to make it possible, in fact
illustrates and underlines the reasons why it was argued during the 1980s that
such a course of action could, in a limited number of extraordinary cases, be
morally and legally desirable, regardless of the technical limitations of the
remedy.
In Fredericks v Stellenbosch Divisional Council 1977 (3) SA 113 (C) the Cape
Provincial Division relied on exactly the same approach in concluding,
without analysis of the doctrinal merits of the impossibility argument, that
the mandament was indeed a suitable and the most sensible remedy for such
an occasion. The facts in Fredericks were almost identical to those in
Tswelopele, and the two courts voiced remarkably similar sentiments in
condemning the state’s high-handed actions. Both courts came to the same
decision, holding that the state should restore the despoiled applicants’
previous position. The only difference is the fact that neither s 26(3) of the
Constitution nor PIE existed when Fredericks was decided; the Prevention of
Illegal SquattingAct 52 of 1951 which regulated unlawful occupation of land
and eviction at that stage placed far fewer and less onerous restrictions on the
state in effecting forced removals. The court in Fredericks did not pay much
attention to the question whether the remedy lent itself to restoration orders
that would require use of replacement materials — the decision was
subjected to doctrinal criticism for that reason — but instead focused on the
result that it wanted to reach, namely restoration ante omnia. In a sense,
considering the social and political context, one could perhaps say that
Fredericks was a decidedly political decision because of this attitude,
downplaying the doctrinal and historical considerations in order to ensure
what the court regarded as the just outcome.
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At a doctrinal level, the argument that the mandament is a possessory
remedy that becomes redundant when the property is destroyed, because
restoration cannot technically include use of replacement materials, is
therefore not as simple as it may appear. The impossibility argument does
have the force of logic, but the matter is more complex than it appears and
there are aspects of it that deserve more analysis than was afforded in either
Rikhotso (supra) or Tswelopele. (For a broader discussion see D G Kleyn Die
Mandament van Spolie in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (unpublished LLD thesis,
University of Pretoria, 1986) 308ff.) For the moment, the following brief
remarks must stand in for a fuller discussion.
First, the historical, political and constitutional context within which this
kind of eviction case is adjudicated nowadays surely demands a more
rigorous and sceptical analysis and evaluation of the impossibility argument
than was the case under apartheid land law. In the absence of such a rigorous
and critical analysis it could well be asked whether the common-law
tradition is not simply being allowed to uphold existing hierarchies of power
and privilege, something that the courts now have to avoid according to P E
Municipality (supra). At the very least, one would expect a discussion of the
way in which the shacks were constructed and the nature of the materials
used. A further point for critical analysis in view of the new constitutional
context is the nature of the property. Surely the issues are different when
dealing with non-fungible property such as oil paintings and Rolex watches
and even luxury Tuscan villas, on the one hand, compared to informal shelters
built from bits and pieces of wood, plastic sheeting and corrugated iron, on the
other? It may well be argued that s 26 of the Constitution requires making this
distinction and developing the common law accordingly.
In the end it depends rather on what one sees as the property that was
unlawfully occupied and illegally despoiled in the ﬁrst place. To use the
words of Fox, what is at stake here is perhaps not primarily a property interest
in the material object(s) but a home interest in the shelter that it provided
(Lorna Fox Conceptualising Home: Theories, Laws and Policies (2007)). In the
case of an informal shack (as opposed to the Tuscan villa) it is the shelter, the
home, that was occupied and destroyed rather than the house, and for
purposes of the shack dweller’s home interest (as opposed to the owner of the
Tuscan villa) the materials used in the original construction and in eventual
restoration might well be irrelevant. At least in the case of rudimentary
shelters constructed with basic, fungible materials it could be argued that the
home character of the shelter is more important than its property character,
which might in turn affect one’s evaluation of the weight that should attach
to the impossibility argument. Obviously this argument is not strong enough
on its own simply to sweep counter-arguments from the table, but in the
context it has enough force to deserve serious consideration before deciding
that the remedy was simply not available for doctrinal reasons. In the new
constitutional climate, political background and social context must carry
some weight; doctrinal technicalities cannot predetermine the outcome. To
insist on the historical and dogmatic force of the technical impossibility
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argument in the speciﬁc instance of a home, an informal shack that can
quickly, easily and cheaply be replaced using fungible and even used
materials, smacks of sophistry.
The crucial point in Kleyn’s historical explanation of the impossibility
argument is that replacement is technically out of place in the application of a
possessory remedy. Historically speaking, this observation is unquestionably
correct. However, Kleyn’s historical analysis of the characteristics of the
mandament van spolie indicates that it is also a robust and extraordinary
remedy that enables the courts to grant robust and speedy but temporary
relief. Clearly these characteristics allow for an approach that could ﬁt in with
the idea that the remedy should, in certain extraordinary instances, be
available even when restoration requires the use of replacement materials
(Kleyn op cit 308ff). This would require a distinction between ‘normal’
instances, where stricter insistence on the possessory nature of the remedy
would be self-evident (eg when non-fungible materials were used in the
construction of the property) or justiﬁed (eg when use of replacement
materials is possible but not really necessary or justiﬁed in the circumstances)
and extraordinary cases, where there are strong reasons to justify a
replacement order that would require the use of replacement materials.
Indications of such an extraordinary instance would be the fact that the
property was destroyed cynically in order to frustrate a restoration order, that
the property was constructed of fungible materials which could be replaced
easily and cheaply, and that such an order would further constitutional values
and goals. In these extraordinary cases, expansive application of the remedy
could link up very neatly with the injunction to promote the values and
objectives of the Constitution. Kleyn’s historical analysis further indicates
that the remedy had a punitive character in Roman-Dutch law, which means
that there are historical indications that the remedy was once and could again
be used, in suitable cases, to enforce restoration by use of replacement
materials. The fact that the court granted a restoration order in Tswelopele is in
itself an indication that it considered this an extraordinary case in which a
restoration order was justiﬁed. One might expect that even the vaguest
indication of historical roots for giving such an order on the basis of the
mandament would have been sufﬁcient to justify a suitable application of the
remedy. However, the SCA decided to follow Rikhotso (supra) and held that
the mandament was historically not available in cases that required
replacement materials to be used. Consequently, the court next had to decide
whether the remedy could be developed to serve the required purpose.
Could the mandament be developed?
The appellants in Tswelopele argued that the respondents should be instructed
to use replacement materials because they had cynically destroyed the
original building materials during the demolition. In response to the
argument that the mandament is not suitable in cases where replacement
materials have to be used, the appellants argued that the mandament should
be developed in line with the Constitution to afford them the relief they
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sought, namely to have the responsible authorities rebuild their shacks with
replacement materials.
The SCA agreed with the appellants’ basic argument that a broader
remedy should be developed under the Constitution: ‘the Constitution
preserves the common law, but requires the courts to synchronize it with the
Bill of Rights’, where necessary by either developing or scrapping
common-law rules (para 20). This, the court noted, does not mean ‘that
every common law mechanism, institution or doctrine needs constitutional
overhaul’ or that a common-law remedy must always necessarily be used and
adapted for constitutional purposes (ibid). On the contrary, so the court
asserted, it may sometimes be better to leave the common law ‘untouched’
and ‘craft a new constitutional remedy entirely’ (ibid). In other words, the
proposition that a remedy should be developed under the Constitution could
mean either that the existing common-law remedy should be developed or
adapted or that an entirely new constitutional remedy should be crafted
while leaving the common-law tradition unchanged. By the same token,
development of a remedy under the Constitution does not mean that the
common law must necessarily be amended or adapted in every instance
where the available common-law remedy falls short of current requirements.
On the whole this approach seems reasonable, perhaps with the qualiﬁer
that common-law institutions, rules or remedies should not be seen in
isolation when making this decision. Instead, a court should consider the
relevant rule, institution or remedy within its larger doctrinal, historical and
social background before deciding whether a constitutional overhaul is
necessary or whether it would be in order to leave the common law
‘untouched’. More speciﬁcally, it seems necessary in every property case in
which legal, social and economic hierarchy, marginalization, disadvantage
and injustice are issues, even tangentially, to reconsider the whole structure
of the relevant aspect of property law (in this case restoration of residential
possession that was destroyed by unlawful action) in its historical and
constitutional context so as to ensure that the approach selected for that
particular decision does not entrench or continue past patterns of injustice
and that it might contribute to the establishment and promotion of
transformational and constitutional values and objectives. Property law
played a large part in the history of colonial, postcolonial and apartheid South
Africa, not in isolated little bits and pieces (such as apartheid legislation) but
as a complete regime or structure that allowed, accommodated and
eventually strengthened (whether intentionally or not) the injustices that
were committed through apartheid land law, including forced removals. The
entire property regime need not be overhauled or changed every time the
common law requires adaptation or development, but the underlying
structure of the property regime and its effect on the entrenchment of
privilege and power embodied in property holdings does need to be
reconsidered whenever the appropriateness of common-law remedies is at
stake. Given the sentiments expressed so clearly and forcibly by the court,
this was surely just such an occasion — eviction and forced removal of
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marginalized people from informal shacks, combined with cynical destruc-
tion of the building materials, represent what may perhaps be described as an
unwelcome repetition of the very core of apartheid land law. The court
acknowledged this in pointing out the similarities between this case and
apartheid evictions. Following that, one might expect that analysis of the
need to develop the common law in this area would begin with a rigorous
and critical reappraisal of the legal framework within which similar evictions
(and legal resistance against them in as far as that was possible) featured in the
apartheid era.
However, the SCA decided that this case did not require constitutional
development of the mandament so as to allow the expanded order required,
which would involve re-erecting the structures that were demolished, where
necessary by using alternative building materials — ‘I do not think that
formulating an appropriate constitutional remedy in this case requires us to
seize upon a common law analogy and force it to perform a constitutional
function’ (para 26). Instead, the court judged that this was a case where it
would be better to leave the common law ‘untouched’ and ‘craft a new
constitutional remedy entirely’ (para 20), a remedy that is ‘special to the
Constitution, whose engraftment on the mandament would constitute an
unnecessary superﬂuity’ (para 27). The respondents in the initial application
were therefore ordered to rebuild the structures they had destroyed, using
replacement materials where necessary, to provide temporary, habitable
dwellings affording shelter, privacy and amenities at least equivalent to those
that were destroyed, and capable of being dismantled and removed should
the occupiers be evicted again.
It is worth repeating that the development of the common-law remedy
the applicants argued for was not huge — the case required no more than a
ﬁnding that a replacement order would be possible in the very limited
circumstances where fungible and even used materials such as corrugated
iron, sheets of plastic and bits of wood could be used easily, quickly and
cheaply to rebuild an informal residential shack that was destroyed illegally.
The ﬁnding could even be restricted to cases where the state was the
respondent, since any wider ﬁnding would have been obiter in the
circumstances. Even if one regards this as an expanded version of the original
spoliation remedy, such an order would be justiﬁed under the constitutional
obligation to develop the common law, and it would serve the purpose the
court set out to reach, namely to instil the required humility in the
authorities who wield power over the weak and marginalized, and could
bring reassurance and hope for those who had been affected by the
high-handedness of the authorities in the past. Moreover, in Fredericks (supra)
there is existing authority that could be used as a starting-point for such a
mild but effective development of the common law. On the authority of
Fredericks it could be argued that the required development had already been
effected and that the ﬁnding in Rikhotso (supra) was unnecessarily restrictive.
Instead, the SCAchose to rely on the conﬂicting authority of Rikhotso and to
strike down the decision in Fredericks, while nonetheless giving an order that
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reaches the same result as in Fredericks and the opposite of the result in
Rikhotso. The only reason for this apparently contradictory result is the
court’s wish to uphold the purity of the common-law tradition by giving the
restoration order under the auspices of the Constitution rather than the
common law. How should we evaluate that choice?
Was it necessary to create a new constitutional remedy?
It is easy enough to argue that the court’s choice not to develop the common
law but to craft an entirely new constitutional remedy for the occasion at
least reached the correct result and that the route by which it got there is not
so very important. And in fact, the SCA cannot be faulted on the outcome of
this case; indeed, it should be lauded for the clarity and determination with
which it set out to do the right thing. However, I would like to argue that
the route by which the court got there is not as unimportant as it might seem.
Development of the common law is arguably the one area in which the
constitutional transformation of South African law still leaves the most to be
done, particularly in property law. Many of the constitutional goals have
been spelled out in legislation and in some cases the transformation process is
developing along the inexorable path of interpretation and application of
legislation — land reform is the most obvious example. However, precious
little has been done about the development of the common law itself. It is
also perhaps the one area in which the transformation process is least obvious
and most controversial — one suspects that many lawyers would be at a loss
to explain exactly why or how constitutional development of the common
law of property should take place, if at all. Even if they are in full and
wholehearted agreement with the general process of transformation of the
law to promote constitutional goals, many property lawyers might prefer the
process of transformation to take place in the broad arena of constitutional
law, leaving the common law untouched and unaffected as far as possible.
However, there are good reasons why this is not the best way to approach
the relationship between property law and the new constitutional dispensa-
tion. In this regard my main criticism against the decision in Tswelopele is that
the SCA missed a golden opportunity to steer the development of property
law under the Constitution in a fruitful direction, which could simulta-
neously promote constitutional goals and help to reinforce the legitimacy
and vibrancy of the common law.
The ﬁrst argument is one of aesthetics. One of the most serious problems
with apartheid land law was the pretence, broadly upheld over a long time,
that apartheid was something separate from and outside of private law, and
particularly property law. In other words, property lawyers washed their
hands of apartheid on the basis of that old chestnut, the politics vs law
dichotomy. Law (especially private law) was something that lawyers did,
apartheid was something that politicians did, and the two had little or no
point of contact; hence the general failure, especially in Afrikaans-language
law faculties with a strong focus on the Roman-Dutch tradition in private
law, to include apartheid law in the Property syllabus during the heyday of
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the previous regime. Some law faculties might have covered aspects
of apartheid land law in other areas of the curricula; very few did so within
the Property Law syllabus. Now that we have come to recognize the folly of
that approach, it does seem rather curious and unfortunate to argue, even in
the mildest and most transformation-friendly way, that signiﬁcant reforms of
property law that directly serve to correct the lingering legacy of apartheid
land law should also take place separately, outside of private law, in a
nebulous constitutional sphere which would ostensibly leave private-law
tradition untouched. In the absence of a convincing reason why the speciﬁc
tradition — or private-law tradition in general — should remain untouched
by constitutionally driven transformation, this line of argument leaves me
dissatisﬁed. Can we really argue that there is an ideal or essential form for this
or any other common-law remedy that remained innocent of the apartheid
order under which it existed and functioned for decades, and that still
deserves to be preserved — left untouched — by constitutionally driven
development in the post-apartheid era? Or is the idea rather that the
common law should be open to ‘normal’ development, according to its own
internal logic, but left untouched by Constitution-driven development? The
latter view is certainly held by some lawyers; I assume that it does not ﬁnd
favour in the courts. It certainly negates the notion that we now have just
one system of law, developing under the auspices of the Constitution.
Apart from the aesthetic argument, I have another, more serious concern.
Doctrinally pure as it might be, the Tswelopele decision fails to reﬂect the real
and the potential transformative signiﬁcance of decisions such as Fredericks
(supra), where the embattled apartheid courts amazingly succeeded, albeit in
ﬁts and starts, in using what little means they had available, prior to the new
constitutional era, to craft effective remedies for marginalized people who
were cynically evicted from the shelter they had under apartheid legislation.
Surely the judicial history embodied in Fredericks should, in its historical and
political context, now be seen as a judicial triumph and not as an (arguably)
doctrinal aberration or a (logical) mistake? And surely that tradition is
something to be proud of in the new constitutional era; something to build
on where possible rather than reject as a doctrinally unsound deviation
(supposedly) from Roman-Dutch law (where the remedy was applied
differently in any event)? Historically, the mandament van spolie has perhaps
undergone more substantive and far-reaching changes and developments
since its introduction in early South African law than the one that is required
by the Fredericks-style argument about restoration using replacement materi-
als. Contemporary historical research, based on the results already reached
and set out by Kleyn, could be interesting. In my view, the court missed an
opportunity in Tswelopele to celebrate the political and social bravery of
decisions such as Fredericks, regardless of the (surely technical and perhaps
even marginal) intellectual and doctrinal compromises that might be
required in the process.
Finally, it should be said that the creation of a completely new
constitutional remedy to reach the desired result in this case raises more
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questions than it answers. What are the requirements for this remedy, and
exactly when does it ﬁnd application? How is this remedy different from the
mandament van spolie? Does it come into play only when the mandament is
unavailable because of destruction of the original materials to be restored?
How far can the courts go in ordering restoration of spoliated possession by
means of this remedy? Is it also available when non-fungible property has
been destroyed? One of the strongest objections that was raised against
doctrinal (as opposed to constitutional) development of the mandament van
spolie to allow for restoration using replacement materials was that the
remedy would not have any obvious limits. This objection must apply even
more strongly with respect to the new constitutional remedy developed by
the court in this case, without any indication of its limits or the
considerations that could assist in determining its scope and effects.
One should recognize that the courts are in a difﬁcult position in cases like
this; they are vulnerable to criticism whether they develop the common law
or not, and the choice is often an almost impossibly difﬁcult one involving
many considerations that fall far outside the narrow conﬁnes of doing justice
by the parties in a particular case. Moreover, given the court’s very clear and
unambiguous position on the justice that had to be (and was) done in this
case, one hesitates to be overly critical — this is a decision that I would rather
embrace than reject.
However, having said that, and with real sympathy and respect for the
position of the court, I personally still think that this decision represents an
opportunity missed. All things considered it is probably not really so
important, doctrinally speaking, whether the mandament van spolie can be
used to force restoration of despoiled property even when replacement
materials have to be employed. But in the historical and political context of
evictions and arbitrary destruction of informal and precarious homes it might
have been a good opportunity to celebrate the small judicial victories over
apartheid injustice that have been recorded through use — and arguably
judicial expansion — of this common-law remedy, thereby overcoming the
uncomfortable, sharp division between common-law and constitutional
remedies and replacing it with a very signiﬁcant bond between the two,
based on a shared concern for the rule of law and for social justice.
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